AC-2 Account Management
PartialOrg roles are server-checked, every role change is recorded, one owner per org is enforced, and directory deprovisioning over SCIM revokes sessions platform-wide.
Gap: Accounts are not disabled automatically after inactivity, and production (Google Cloud) accounts have no automated joiner/leaver process.
src/security/roleChangeAudit.test.tssrc/security/orgOwnerInvariant.test.tssrc/security/ssoBinding.test.ts
AC-3 Access Enforcement
ImplementedEvery callable and domain route that takes an org id checks membership before org-scoped work; client reads go through default-deny Firestore rules tested in an emulator red-team suite.
src/security/callableTenantGuards.test.tssrc/security/domainRouteTenantGuards.test.tssrc/security/usersDocOwnerOnly.test.tssrc/security/rulesSuiteReachable.test.ts.github/workflows/rules-red-team.yml
AC-5 Separation of Duties
PartialMaker and checker are enforced where the platform grants licensed access, approves payments above a threshold, or opens break-glass access.
Gap: One person holds every production privilege (Google Cloud owner, source control admin, deployer). Separation of duties for operations is compensating controls and review cadence, not a second person.
src/security/licenseDecideMakerChecker.test.tssrc/security/dualApprovalReachable.test.tssrc/security/breakGlass.test.ts
AC-6 Least Privilege
PartialEach domain service has a least-privilege role manifest checked against the code, and the live project's IAM is compared to that manifest.
Gap: The drift check holds at zero for service accounts but does not cover per-secret accessor grants, needs live credentials to run, and broad human grants (project owner) are not time-bound.
src/security/serviceRoles.test.tssrc/security/iamDrift.test.tsscripts/check-iam-drift.mjsinfra/service-iam-policy.jsonc
AC-7 Unsuccessful Logon Attempts
ImplementedTOTP verification has an attempt ceiling with a lockout, a code works once, and sign-in-adjacent routes are rate limited.
src/security/totpGuardAndAuthRate.test.tssrc/security/rateLimitIpKey.test.ts
An app lock and an inactivity sign-out exist, with a deliberate hold for attended box-office kiosks.
Gap: The lock is not enforced uniformly by policy for every privileged session, and the kiosk hold is an exception an assessor will want documented.
src/security/appLock.test.tssrc/security/sessionHold.test.ts
AC-17 Remote Access
PartialAPI keys can be locked to IP addresses and fail closed when the caller's address is unknown.
Gap: Administrative remote access to Google Cloud is not restricted to managed devices or networks.
src/security/apiKeyIpAllowlistFailsClosed.test.tssrc/security/clientIpTrust.test.ts
AT-2 Literacy Training and Awareness
PlannedNone.
Gap: No security awareness training program or record. Needed before any assessment, including for contractors.
AU-2 Event Logging
PartialSign-in, role, safety and Wally action events are emitted to an observability bus that can forward to a customer's SIEM.
Gap: No written list of auditable events mapped to AU-2, and no review of that list.
src/security/authObservability.test.tssrc/security/roleChangeAudit.test.ts
AU-6 Audit Record Review, Analysis, and Reporting
PartialThe built-in SIEM correlates and alerts on platform events; key-compromise telemetry raises alarms on decoy credential use.
Gap: No defined review cadence or reviewer for Turtini's own platform logs, and no record that reviews happen.
src/security/decoyCredentials.test.tsdocs/key-compromise-telemetry.md
AU-9 Protection of Audit Information
PartialAccounting writes, Wally actions, AI runs and federation decisions land on hash chains that detect retroactive edits; checkpoints compare against the rows themselves.
Gap: Platform infrastructure logs (Cloud Logging) are not chained or exported to write-once storage, and the chains are not anchored outside Turtini.
src/security/wallyActivityChain.test.tssrc/security/auditCheckpoints.test.tssrc/security/aiRunsAreInTheChain.test.tsfunctions/src/lib/federation/auditChain.test.ts
AU-12 Audit Record Generation
PartialAudit records are generated at the decision points that have chains or observability events.
Gap: Coverage is per module; there is no platform-wide guarantee that every privileged action generates a record.
src/security/authObservability.test.ts
CA-2 Control Assessments
PlannedNone. All statuses in this program are self-assessed.
Gap: No independent control assessment has been performed.
CA-5 Plan of Action and Milestones
PartialEvery partial and planned control in this program carries its gap, which is the seed of a plan of action and milestones.
Gap: Gaps have no owners, due dates or risk ratings yet, which a POA&M requires.
docs/compliance/README.mdsrc/security/complianceProgram.test.ts
CA-7 Continuous Monitoring
PartialRunning runtimes are checked against security releases twice a day, served images are scanned daily, and IAM is compared to its manifest.
Gap: No continuous monitoring strategy document, and secret-access anomaly detection is blind until the logging viewer role is granted.
src/security/runtimeCurrencyGate.test.tssrc/security/scanStagedFiles.test.tsscripts/check-runtime-currency.mjs
CA-8 Penetration Testing
PlannedNone.
Gap: No external penetration test has been performed.
CM-2 Baseline Configuration
PartialContainer images patch their base at build time and drop build tools; storage lifecycle and IAM are declared in version control.
Gap: Base images float (node:24-alpine) rather than being pinned by digest, and there is no hardened baseline against a STIG or CIS benchmark.
src/security/imageHardening.test.tssrc/security/dockerfileHygiene.test.tsinfra/storage-lifecycle.json
CM-3 Configuration Change Control
PartialA deploy from a dirty working tree is blocked, every deploy records the commit it shipped, and the frontend and its server renderer cut over together.
Gap: Changes are not reviewed by a second person before they merge, and the security gates can be skipped with an environment variable.
src/security/deployDirtyTreeGate.test.tssrc/security/frontendSsrCutoverOrder.test.tsscripts/write-deploy-provenance.mjs
CM-6 Configuration Settings
PartialSecurity headers are re-established on every nginx block that sets its own headers, and the enforced CSP is checked against the origins the product needs.
Gap: Only part of the Content-Security-Policy is enforced; the full policy is report-only and allowlists third-party origins.
src/security/nginxSecurityHeaders.test.tssrc/security/cspRequiredOrigins.test.ts
CM-8 System Component Inventory
PartialA cryptography inventory ratchets every use of a primitive; third-party licenses are inventoried and attributed.
Gap: No software bill of materials (SPDX or CycloneDX) is produced per image, and no system component inventory of cloud resources.
src/security/cryptoInventory.test.tssrc/security/ipEarlyWarning.test.tsdocs/crypto-bill-of-materials.md
CP-2 Contingency Plan
PlannedThe Information Security Policy states that production runs on managed infrastructure deployable from version control.
Gap: No contingency plan with recovery objectives (RTO, RPO), roles, or a tested procedure.
CP-9 System Backup
PartialFirestore point-in-time recovery (7 days), a daily native backup schedule (98-day retention), a weekly selective export, Cloud Storage object versioning, and a daily source-code bundle.
Gap: No automated check that the backup schedule and PITR are still enabled, Firebase Auth users are not backed up, and no restore has been rehearsed on a schedule.
functions/src/dr.tsinfra/storage-lifecycle.json.github/workflows/daily-backup.yml
CP-10 System Recovery and Reconstitution
PlannedFirestore rules can be restored from a backup in one command.
Gap: No documented or tested recovery of the database, functions and domain services as a whole.
scripts/rules-deploy.mjs
IA-2 Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users)
PartialPassword accounts enroll TOTP or a passkey; passkeys are origin-bound; a passed second factor is a server-checked fact; protected actions require step-up; platform-admin power can require a passkey session.
Gap: Multi-factor authentication for org administrators is a prompt, not a gate, and Google sign-ins rely on the identity provider's MFA without Turtini enforcing it. Phishing-resistant MFA is not required for privileged users.
src/security/secondFactorSession.test.tssrc/security/stepUpProtectedActions.test.tssrc/security/passkeyOriginBinding.test.tssrc/security/adminPasskeySession.test.tssrc/security/adminMfaPrompt.test.ts
IA-5 Authenticator Management
PartialA phished password cannot register a passkey, TOTP codes are single use, recovery paths exist, and the account holder is notified of every factor change.
Gap: SMS remains an available recovery factor, and password policy is the identity provider's default rather than a documented Turtini policy.
src/security/passkeyEnrollmentProof.test.tssrc/security/securityNotices.test.tssrc/security/mfaSmsFallback.test.ts
IR-4 Incident Handling
PartialKey-compromise telemetry turns an incident into a per-credential rotate or no-evidence verdict, from decoys, payment reconciliation and secret-access logs.
Gap: Incident handling outside credential compromise is the four-line section 7 of the Information Security Policy.
src/security/keyCompromiseCore.test.tsscripts/key-incident-triage.mjsdocs/key-compromise-telemetry.md
IR-6 Incident Reporting
PlannedIncidents are reported to [email protected].
Gap: No reporting timelines to customers, FedRAMP, CISA or DoD (DFARS 252.204-7012 requires 72 hours), and no named contacts.
IR-8 Incident Response Plan
PlannedNone beyond the policy section.
Gap: No incident response plan with roles, severity levels and communication steps, and no tabletop exercise.
docs/information-security-policy.md
MA-4 Nonlocal Maintenance
InheritedGoogle Cloud operates and maintains the infrastructure.
Gap: Covers Google's infrastructure only.
PE-3 Physical Access Control
InheritedPhysical access to the data centers is Google Cloud's control.
Gap: Turtini's own endpoints (the founder's laptop holds deploy credentials) are not covered by any inherited control.
PL-2 System Security and Privacy Plans
PlannedNone.
Gap: No system security plan. The SOC 2 audit scope draft is the starting point for the boundary.
PS-3 Personnel Screening
PlannedNone.
Gap: No personnel screening procedure for anyone given production access.
RA-3 Risk Assessment
PartialA threat model exists for the government program, and security findings are tracked in the repository.
Gap: No risk assessment of the hosted platform as a whole, and no risk register with likelihood and impact.
docs/gov/threat-model.mdsecurity-findings.json
RA-5 Vulnerability Monitoring and Scanning
ImplementedServed container images are scanned daily with a reviewed acceptance list, lockfiles are checked against a vulnerable-version floor, and npm audit gates the build.
src/security/scanStagedFiles.test.tssrc/security/acceptedFindings.test.tssrc/security/vulnerablePins.test.tssrc/security/npmAuditRatchet.test.tsscripts/scan-served-images.mjs
SA-9 External System Services
PartialSub-processors are listed, and the published list is checked against the code that calls them.
Gap: Several sub-processors' SOC 2 reports are marked unconfirmed in the audit scope.
src/data/subprocessors.test.tscompliance/audit-scope.md
SA-11 Developer Testing and Evaluation
ImplementedEvery reported bug fix lands with a regression guard that was shown to fail on the old code, and every test file in the repository is collected by the runner.
src/security/regressionGuards.test.tssrc/security/everyTestIsCollected.test.tsdocs/regression-guards.md
SC-7 Boundary Protection
PartialOutbound fetches of user-supplied URLs go through a connect-time private-address guard; the edge (Cloudflare) fronts public traffic.
Gap: No documented boundary diagram, and services are reachable on public Cloud Run URLs rather than only through a managed perimeter.
src/security/linkPreviewSsrf.test.tssrc/security/lodgingIcalSsrf.test.ts
SC-8 Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity
PartialTraffic is TLS; the mail server connection verifies its certificate.
Gap: The edge's minimum TLS version is not set in code and has not been verified.
src/security/mailTlsVerified.test.ts
SC-12 Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management
PartialIntegration credentials live in Secret Manager behind one module, and status documents readable by members never hold a credential.
Gap: The Cloud KMS backend for org secrets is implemented but not cut over (its key does not exist yet), and 16 files still call Secret Manager directly.
src/security/integrationDocNoCredentials.test.tssrc/security/functionSecretBindings.test.ts
SC-13 Cryptographic Protection
PlannedNode's bundled OpenSSL and Google-managed encryption.
Gap: No FIPS 140-3 validated cryptographic module is in use. Required for CUI and for FedRAMP.
src/security/cryptoInventory.test.ts
SC-28 Protection of Information at Rest
InheritedFirestore and Cloud Storage encrypt data at rest with Google-managed keys.
Gap: Customer-managed keys (BYOK) for integration credentials are built but never exercised against a real key.
SI-2 Flaw Remediation
ImplementedA deploy is refused while a running service is behind a security release or on an end-of-life line, and vulnerable dependency versions are refused in every lockfile.
src/security/runtimeCurrencyGate.test.tssrc/security/vulnerablePins.test.tsscripts/check-runtime-currency.mjs
SI-4 System Monitoring
PartialDecoy credentials, processor reconciliation and secret-access anomaly detection watch for credential misuse.
Gap: Secret-access anomaly detection reports BLIND until roles/logging.privateLogViewer is granted; there is no intrusion detection on the infrastructure itself.
src/security/decoyCredentials.test.tssrc/security/keyCompromiseCore.test.ts
SI-7 Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity
PartialOver-the-air app bundles carry a checksum that is verified before staging.
Gap: Container images and release bundles are not signed, and no build provenance (SLSA) is produced.
src/security/otaBundleIntegrity.test.ts
SI-12 Information Management and Retention
PartialA published retention and disposal policy defines periods per data class and states where enforcement is not yet automated; org export is complete and streamed.
Gap: Several retention periods are enforced by procedure, not automation.
docs/data-retention-and-disposal-policy.mdsrc/security/orgExportComplete.test.ts
SR-3 Supply Chain Controls and Processes
PartialDependency floors, license inventory and image scanning cover the software supply chain.
Gap: No supply chain risk management plan, no SBOM, and no signed artifacts.
src/security/vulnerablePins.test.tssrc/security/ipEarlyWarning.test.ts