Compliance roadmap

What we are working toward.And exactly how far along we are.

Turtini holds no FedRAMP certification or authorization, no CMMC certification, no DoD provisional authorization at any Impact Level, no agency ATO, and no SOC 2 report. This program records what we are working toward and how far the platform's own mechanisms get us. Control statuses are self-assessed from automated checks in our code; none of it has been independently assessed.

This page is generated from the program file our build checks. If any page on turtini.com claims a certification this program does not record, the build fails.

Targets

Where each one stands today.

SOC 2 Type II

AICPA Trust Services Criteria (2017, revised points of focus 2022)

In progress

The audit scope is drafted. No compliance-automation platform, no CPA firm, and no observation window has started. No report exists.

NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 Moderate base controls (177)

  • 5 implemented
  • 3 inherited
  • 28 partial
  • 9 planned
  • 132 not assessed
Assessor
CPA firm (licensed to issue SOC reports) (not yet selected)
Sponsor
None required
Next: Choose a compliance-automation platform, or run evidence collection from our own checks (Date not set)
  1. Audit scope draftedDone
  2. Choose a compliance-automation platform, or run evidence collection from our own checksDate not set
  3. Engage a CPA firmDate not set
  4. Type I report (optional)Date not set
  5. Type II observation window opensDate not set
  6. Type II report issuedDate not set

Type I (point in time) is an optional first step; Type II needs an observation window, typically 3 to 12 months. FedRAMP 20x Class A is designed for products that already hold a SOC 2 Type II report, so this target gates the FedRAMP on-ramp.

FedRAMP, Moderate-aligned (Class C)

FedRAMP Consolidated Rules for 2026 (20x Class C, or Rev5 Class C)

Not started

No FedRAMP application, assessor or sponsor. Engineering mechanisms below are the readiness work.

NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 Moderate base controls (177)

  • 5 implemented
  • 3 inherited
  • 28 partial
  • 9 planned
  • 132 not assessed
Assessor
FedRAMP Recognized independent assessment service (3PAO) (not yet selected)
Sponsor
Not required on the 20x Program Certification path. A Rev5 Class C certification needs an agency sponsor (Agency Certification path).
Next: SOC 2 Type II report (Class A prerequisite) (Date not set)
  1. SOC 2 Type II report (Class A prerequisite)Date not set
  2. FedRAMP 20x Class A certification (on-ramp)Date not set
  3. Select a FedRAMP Recognized assessorDate not set
  4. Define the authorization boundary (which modules, which Google Cloud services)Date not set
  5. FedRAMP Class C certificationDate not set

FedRAMP now certifies by class (A to D) rather than Low/Moderate/High; Class C covers most Low and Moderate security objectives. The suggested start is 20x Class A, which expects an existing SOC 2 Type II. New Rev5 certification applications close 2027-06-11.

FedRAMP, High-aligned (Class D)

FedRAMP Consolidated Rules for 2026 (Class D)

Not started

Follows the Class C certification.

NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 High base controls (188)

  • 5 implemented
  • 3 inherited
  • 28 partial
  • 10 planned
  • 142 not assessed
Assessor
FedRAMP Recognized independent assessment service (3PAO) (not yet selected)
Sponsor
Agency sponsor required for Rev5 Class D. 20x Class D is listed by FedRAMP as coming in 2027.
Next: FedRAMP Class C certification (Date not set)
  1. FedRAMP Class C certificationDate not set
  2. Agency sponsor (or 20x Class D once available)Date not set
  3. FedRAMP Class D certificationDate not set

FedRAMP advises against starting at Class C or D without an agency contract that requires it.

CMMC Level 2

CMMC Program, 32 CFR Part 170 (Level 2 = NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2)

Not started

No self-assessment score has been posted and no C3PAO is engaged. CMMC applies to Turtini only once Turtini processes, stores or transmits CUI for a defense contractor.

NIST SP 800-171 Rev 3 requirements (97)

  • 5 implemented
  • 36 partial
  • 7 planned
  • 49 not assessed
Assessor
CMMC Third-Party Assessment Organization (C3PAO) authorized by the Cyber AB (not yet selected)
Sponsor
A defense contract that requires Level 2
Next: Decide whether any Turtini offering will hold CUI, and for which customers (Date not set)
  1. Decide whether any Turtini offering will hold CUI, and for which customersDate not set
  2. System security plan for the CUI boundaryDate not set
  3. Self-assessment score postedDate not set
  4. Engage a C3PAODate not set
  5. CMMC Level 2 certificationDate not set

A cloud service that stores CUI for a contractor is generally also expected to meet FedRAMP Moderate or equivalent under DFARS 252.204-7012, which ties this target to fedramp-moderate.

DoD Impact Level 4

DoD Cloud Computing Security Requirements Guide (CC SRG)

Not started

Turtini runs in commercial Google Cloud (us-central1), not in an environment Google offers for IL4 workloads. The hosting boundary would have to move before any IL4 assessment.

NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 Moderate base controls (177)

  • 5 implemented
  • 3 inherited
  • 28 partial
  • 9 planned
  • 132 not assessed
Assessor
FedRAMP Recognized 3PAO, plus DISA review (not yet selected)
Sponsor
A DoD mission owner (component sponsor)
Next: FedRAMP Class C certification (Date not set)
  1. FedRAMP Class C certificationDate not set
  2. Move the authorization boundary onto Google Cloud's IL4 offeringDate not set
  3. DoD mission owner sponsorDate not set
  4. DISA provisional authorization at IL4Date not set

A DISA provisional authorization lets DoD components issue their own ATO. FedRAMP Moderate (Class C) is the practical prerequisite.

DoD Impact Level 5

DoD Cloud Computing Security Requirements Guide (CC SRG)

Not started

Follows IL4. IL5 adds separation from non-federal tenants, which Turtini's shared multi-tenant deployment does not provide.

NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 High base controls (188)

  • 5 implemented
  • 3 inherited
  • 28 partial
  • 10 planned
  • 142 not assessed
Assessor
FedRAMP Recognized 3PAO, plus DISA review (not yet selected)
Sponsor
A DoD mission owner (component sponsor)
Next: DISA provisional authorization at IL4 (Date not set)
  1. DISA provisional authorization at IL4Date not set
  2. Dedicated DoD tenant deploymentDate not set
  3. DISA provisional authorization at IL5Date not set

Expect a dedicated deployment for DoD tenants rather than the shared platform.

Agency ATO for an on-premises enclave (RMF)

NIST SP 800-37 Rev 2 Risk Management Framework

Not started

NASA is the chosen pilot agency; its authorizing official is not yet identified. The on-premises appliance is a prototype and cannot sign anyone in today.

NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 Moderate base controls (177)

  • 5 implemented
  • 3 inherited
  • 28 partial
  • 9 planned
  • 132 not assessed
Assessor
The agency's security control assessor (not yet selected)
Sponsor
NASA (authorizing official to be identified)
Next: Identify the NASA authorizing official (Date not set)
  1. Identify the NASA authorizing officialDate not set
  2. Air-gap feasibility spike (sign-in, rules, triggers, storage, secrets)Date not set
  3. Application evidence package (ASD STIG checklist, SBOM, signed images)Date not set
  4. ATO issued by the agencyDate not set

Impact levels do not apply to an agency-operated enclave: the agency categorizes and authorizes the system itself.

Readiness counts what our own checks prove against the NIST baseline each program builds on. A control we have not mapped yet counts as not assessed, never as done. CMMC Level 2 is assessed against NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2; NIST publishes machine-readable data only for Rev 3, so that figure is a proxy.

Controls

What is in place, and the check that proves it.

46 NIST SP 800-53 controls mapped so far: 5 implemented, 3 inherited from our cloud provider, 28 partial, 10 planned. A control is implemented only when a named automated check in our repository proves it. All of this is self-assessed; none of it has been independently assessed yet.

  • AC-2 Account Management

    Partial

    Org roles are server-checked, every role change is recorded, one owner per org is enforced, and directory deprovisioning over SCIM revokes sessions platform-wide.

    Gap: Accounts are not disabled automatically after inactivity, and production (Google Cloud) accounts have no automated joiner/leaver process.

    src/security/roleChangeAudit.test.tssrc/security/orgOwnerInvariant.test.tssrc/security/ssoBinding.test.ts
  • AC-3 Access Enforcement

    Implemented

    Every callable and domain route that takes an org id checks membership before org-scoped work; client reads go through default-deny Firestore rules tested in an emulator red-team suite.

    src/security/callableTenantGuards.test.tssrc/security/domainRouteTenantGuards.test.tssrc/security/usersDocOwnerOnly.test.tssrc/security/rulesSuiteReachable.test.ts.github/workflows/rules-red-team.yml
  • AC-5 Separation of Duties

    Partial

    Maker and checker are enforced where the platform grants licensed access, approves payments above a threshold, or opens break-glass access.

    Gap: One person holds every production privilege (Google Cloud owner, source control admin, deployer). Separation of duties for operations is compensating controls and review cadence, not a second person.

    src/security/licenseDecideMakerChecker.test.tssrc/security/dualApprovalReachable.test.tssrc/security/breakGlass.test.ts
  • AC-6 Least Privilege

    Partial

    Each domain service has a least-privilege role manifest checked against the code, and the live project's IAM is compared to that manifest.

    Gap: The drift check holds at zero for service accounts but does not cover per-secret accessor grants, needs live credentials to run, and broad human grants (project owner) are not time-bound.

    src/security/serviceRoles.test.tssrc/security/iamDrift.test.tsscripts/check-iam-drift.mjsinfra/service-iam-policy.jsonc
  • AC-7 Unsuccessful Logon Attempts

    Implemented

    TOTP verification has an attempt ceiling with a lockout, a code works once, and sign-in-adjacent routes are rate limited.

    src/security/totpGuardAndAuthRate.test.tssrc/security/rateLimitIpKey.test.ts
  • AC-11 Device Lock

    Partial

    An app lock and an inactivity sign-out exist, with a deliberate hold for attended box-office kiosks.

    Gap: The lock is not enforced uniformly by policy for every privileged session, and the kiosk hold is an exception an assessor will want documented.

    src/security/appLock.test.tssrc/security/sessionHold.test.ts
  • AC-17 Remote Access

    Partial

    API keys can be locked to IP addresses and fail closed when the caller's address is unknown.

    Gap: Administrative remote access to Google Cloud is not restricted to managed devices or networks.

    src/security/apiKeyIpAllowlistFailsClosed.test.tssrc/security/clientIpTrust.test.ts
  • AT-2 Literacy Training and Awareness

    Planned

    None.

    Gap: No security awareness training program or record. Needed before any assessment, including for contractors.

  • AU-2 Event Logging

    Partial

    Sign-in, role, safety and Wally action events are emitted to an observability bus that can forward to a customer's SIEM.

    Gap: No written list of auditable events mapped to AU-2, and no review of that list.

    src/security/authObservability.test.tssrc/security/roleChangeAudit.test.ts
  • AU-6 Audit Record Review, Analysis, and Reporting

    Partial

    The built-in SIEM correlates and alerts on platform events; key-compromise telemetry raises alarms on decoy credential use.

    Gap: No defined review cadence or reviewer for Turtini's own platform logs, and no record that reviews happen.

    src/security/decoyCredentials.test.tsdocs/key-compromise-telemetry.md
  • AU-9 Protection of Audit Information

    Partial

    Accounting writes, Wally actions, AI runs and federation decisions land on hash chains that detect retroactive edits; checkpoints compare against the rows themselves.

    Gap: Platform infrastructure logs (Cloud Logging) are not chained or exported to write-once storage, and the chains are not anchored outside Turtini.

    src/security/wallyActivityChain.test.tssrc/security/auditCheckpoints.test.tssrc/security/aiRunsAreInTheChain.test.tsfunctions/src/lib/federation/auditChain.test.ts
  • AU-12 Audit Record Generation

    Partial

    Audit records are generated at the decision points that have chains or observability events.

    Gap: Coverage is per module; there is no platform-wide guarantee that every privileged action generates a record.

    src/security/authObservability.test.ts
  • CA-2 Control Assessments

    Planned

    None. All statuses in this program are self-assessed.

    Gap: No independent control assessment has been performed.

  • CA-5 Plan of Action and Milestones

    Partial

    Every partial and planned control in this program carries its gap, which is the seed of a plan of action and milestones.

    Gap: Gaps have no owners, due dates or risk ratings yet, which a POA&M requires.

    docs/compliance/README.mdsrc/security/complianceProgram.test.ts
  • CA-7 Continuous Monitoring

    Partial

    Running runtimes are checked against security releases twice a day, served images are scanned daily, and IAM is compared to its manifest.

    Gap: No continuous monitoring strategy document, and secret-access anomaly detection is blind until the logging viewer role is granted.

    src/security/runtimeCurrencyGate.test.tssrc/security/scanStagedFiles.test.tsscripts/check-runtime-currency.mjs
  • CA-8 Penetration Testing

    Planned

    None.

    Gap: No external penetration test has been performed.

  • CM-2 Baseline Configuration

    Partial

    Container images patch their base at build time and drop build tools; storage lifecycle and IAM are declared in version control.

    Gap: Base images float (node:24-alpine) rather than being pinned by digest, and there is no hardened baseline against a STIG or CIS benchmark.

    src/security/imageHardening.test.tssrc/security/dockerfileHygiene.test.tsinfra/storage-lifecycle.json
  • CM-3 Configuration Change Control

    Partial

    A deploy from a dirty working tree is blocked, every deploy records the commit it shipped, and the frontend and its server renderer cut over together.

    Gap: Changes are not reviewed by a second person before they merge, and the security gates can be skipped with an environment variable.

    src/security/deployDirtyTreeGate.test.tssrc/security/frontendSsrCutoverOrder.test.tsscripts/write-deploy-provenance.mjs
  • CM-6 Configuration Settings

    Partial

    Security headers are re-established on every nginx block that sets its own headers, and the enforced CSP is checked against the origins the product needs.

    Gap: Only part of the Content-Security-Policy is enforced; the full policy is report-only and allowlists third-party origins.

    src/security/nginxSecurityHeaders.test.tssrc/security/cspRequiredOrigins.test.ts
  • CM-8 System Component Inventory

    Partial

    A cryptography inventory ratchets every use of a primitive; third-party licenses are inventoried and attributed.

    Gap: No software bill of materials (SPDX or CycloneDX) is produced per image, and no system component inventory of cloud resources.

    src/security/cryptoInventory.test.tssrc/security/ipEarlyWarning.test.tsdocs/crypto-bill-of-materials.md
  • CP-2 Contingency Plan

    Planned

    The Information Security Policy states that production runs on managed infrastructure deployable from version control.

    Gap: No contingency plan with recovery objectives (RTO, RPO), roles, or a tested procedure.

  • CP-9 System Backup

    Partial

    Firestore point-in-time recovery (7 days), a daily native backup schedule (98-day retention), a weekly selective export, Cloud Storage object versioning, and a daily source-code bundle.

    Gap: No automated check that the backup schedule and PITR are still enabled, Firebase Auth users are not backed up, and no restore has been rehearsed on a schedule.

    functions/src/dr.tsinfra/storage-lifecycle.json.github/workflows/daily-backup.yml
  • CP-10 System Recovery and Reconstitution

    Planned

    Firestore rules can be restored from a backup in one command.

    Gap: No documented or tested recovery of the database, functions and domain services as a whole.

    scripts/rules-deploy.mjs
  • IA-2 Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users)

    Partial

    Password accounts enroll TOTP or a passkey; passkeys are origin-bound; a passed second factor is a server-checked fact; protected actions require step-up; platform-admin power can require a passkey session.

    Gap: Multi-factor authentication for org administrators is a prompt, not a gate, and Google sign-ins rely on the identity provider's MFA without Turtini enforcing it. Phishing-resistant MFA is not required for privileged users.

    src/security/secondFactorSession.test.tssrc/security/stepUpProtectedActions.test.tssrc/security/passkeyOriginBinding.test.tssrc/security/adminPasskeySession.test.tssrc/security/adminMfaPrompt.test.ts
  • IA-5 Authenticator Management

    Partial

    A phished password cannot register a passkey, TOTP codes are single use, recovery paths exist, and the account holder is notified of every factor change.

    Gap: SMS remains an available recovery factor, and password policy is the identity provider's default rather than a documented Turtini policy.

    src/security/passkeyEnrollmentProof.test.tssrc/security/securityNotices.test.tssrc/security/mfaSmsFallback.test.ts
  • IR-4 Incident Handling

    Partial

    Key-compromise telemetry turns an incident into a per-credential rotate or no-evidence verdict, from decoys, payment reconciliation and secret-access logs.

    Gap: Incident handling outside credential compromise is the four-line section 7 of the Information Security Policy.

    src/security/keyCompromiseCore.test.tsscripts/key-incident-triage.mjsdocs/key-compromise-telemetry.md
  • IR-6 Incident Reporting

    Planned

    Incidents are reported to [email protected].

    Gap: No reporting timelines to customers, FedRAMP, CISA or DoD (DFARS 252.204-7012 requires 72 hours), and no named contacts.

  • IR-8 Incident Response Plan

    Planned

    None beyond the policy section.

    Gap: No incident response plan with roles, severity levels and communication steps, and no tabletop exercise.

    docs/information-security-policy.md
  • MA-4 Nonlocal Maintenance

    Inherited

    Google Cloud operates and maintains the infrastructure.

    Gap: Covers Google's infrastructure only.

  • PE-3 Physical Access Control

    Inherited

    Physical access to the data centers is Google Cloud's control.

    Gap: Turtini's own endpoints (the founder's laptop holds deploy credentials) are not covered by any inherited control.

  • PL-2 System Security and Privacy Plans

    Planned

    None.

    Gap: No system security plan. The SOC 2 audit scope draft is the starting point for the boundary.

  • PS-3 Personnel Screening

    Planned

    None.

    Gap: No personnel screening procedure for anyone given production access.

  • RA-3 Risk Assessment

    Partial

    A threat model exists for the government program, and security findings are tracked in the repository.

    Gap: No risk assessment of the hosted platform as a whole, and no risk register with likelihood and impact.

    docs/gov/threat-model.mdsecurity-findings.json
  • RA-5 Vulnerability Monitoring and Scanning

    Implemented

    Served container images are scanned daily with a reviewed acceptance list, lockfiles are checked against a vulnerable-version floor, and npm audit gates the build.

    src/security/scanStagedFiles.test.tssrc/security/acceptedFindings.test.tssrc/security/vulnerablePins.test.tssrc/security/npmAuditRatchet.test.tsscripts/scan-served-images.mjs
  • SA-9 External System Services

    Partial

    Sub-processors are listed, and the published list is checked against the code that calls them.

    Gap: Several sub-processors' SOC 2 reports are marked unconfirmed in the audit scope.

    src/data/subprocessors.test.tscompliance/audit-scope.md
  • SA-11 Developer Testing and Evaluation

    Implemented

    Every reported bug fix lands with a regression guard that was shown to fail on the old code, and every test file in the repository is collected by the runner.

    src/security/regressionGuards.test.tssrc/security/everyTestIsCollected.test.tsdocs/regression-guards.md
  • SC-7 Boundary Protection

    Partial

    Outbound fetches of user-supplied URLs go through a connect-time private-address guard; the edge (Cloudflare) fronts public traffic.

    Gap: No documented boundary diagram, and services are reachable on public Cloud Run URLs rather than only through a managed perimeter.

    src/security/linkPreviewSsrf.test.tssrc/security/lodgingIcalSsrf.test.ts
  • SC-8 Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity

    Partial

    Traffic is TLS; the mail server connection verifies its certificate.

    Gap: The edge's minimum TLS version is not set in code and has not been verified.

    src/security/mailTlsVerified.test.ts
  • SC-12 Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management

    Partial

    Integration credentials live in Secret Manager behind one module, and status documents readable by members never hold a credential.

    Gap: The Cloud KMS backend for org secrets is implemented but not cut over (its key does not exist yet), and 16 files still call Secret Manager directly.

    src/security/integrationDocNoCredentials.test.tssrc/security/functionSecretBindings.test.ts
  • SC-13 Cryptographic Protection

    Planned

    Node's bundled OpenSSL and Google-managed encryption.

    Gap: No FIPS 140-3 validated cryptographic module is in use. Required for CUI and for FedRAMP.

    src/security/cryptoInventory.test.ts
  • SC-28 Protection of Information at Rest

    Inherited

    Firestore and Cloud Storage encrypt data at rest with Google-managed keys.

    Gap: Customer-managed keys (BYOK) for integration credentials are built but never exercised against a real key.

  • SI-2 Flaw Remediation

    Implemented

    A deploy is refused while a running service is behind a security release or on an end-of-life line, and vulnerable dependency versions are refused in every lockfile.

    src/security/runtimeCurrencyGate.test.tssrc/security/vulnerablePins.test.tsscripts/check-runtime-currency.mjs
  • SI-4 System Monitoring

    Partial

    Decoy credentials, processor reconciliation and secret-access anomaly detection watch for credential misuse.

    Gap: Secret-access anomaly detection reports BLIND until roles/logging.privateLogViewer is granted; there is no intrusion detection on the infrastructure itself.

    src/security/decoyCredentials.test.tssrc/security/keyCompromiseCore.test.ts
  • SI-7 Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity

    Partial

    Over-the-air app bundles carry a checksum that is verified before staging.

    Gap: Container images and release bundles are not signed, and no build provenance (SLSA) is produced.

    src/security/otaBundleIntegrity.test.ts
  • SI-12 Information Management and Retention

    Partial

    A published retention and disposal policy defines periods per data class and states where enforcement is not yet automated; org export is complete and streamed.

    Gap: Several retention periods are enforced by procedure, not automation.

    docs/data-retention-and-disposal-policy.mdsrc/security/orgExportComplete.test.ts
  • SR-3 Supply Chain Controls and Processes

    Partial

    Dependency floors, license inventory and image scanning cover the software supply chain.

    Gap: No supply chain risk management plan, no SBOM, and no signed artifacts.

    src/security/vulnerablePins.test.tssrc/security/ipEarlyWarning.test.ts

Sources

The rules we are reading.

  • FedRAMP Certification Classes run from A (minimal assurance) to D (significant assurance); Class C covers most Low and Moderate security objectives. Source
  • 20x certifications follow the Program Certification path and do not require an agency sponsor; Rev5 certifications generally follow the Agency Certification path. Source
  • The 20x Class B and C pipeline opened 2026-08-31; the Consolidated Rules become mandatory 2027-01-01; new Rev5 certification applications end 2027-06-11. Source
  • Class B, C and D providers must complete an independent verification and validation assessment with a FedRAMP Recognized assessor (or FedRAMP) at least once a year. Source
  • Class D covers most use cases regardless of security objective, excluding classified systems; 20x Class D is marked coming in 2027 and Rev5 Class D requires Agency Certification. Source
  • The CMMC program rule (32 CFR Part 170) took effect 2024-12-16 and the DFARS acquisition rule 2025-11-10, starting Phase 1 (self-assessments). Source (not yet confirmed against the primary source)
  • Phase 2, in which Level 2 C3PAO certification becomes the standard requirement in applicable contracts, was scheduled to begin 2026-11-10; at least one secondary source reports that start on hold. Confirm on the DoD CMMC site before relying on it. Source (not yet confirmed against the primary source)
  • The CC SRG uses the FedRAMP Moderate baseline at every impact level and adds DoD controls and enhancements; the current SRG revision has not been confirmed on cyber.mil in this repository. Source (not yet confirmed against the primary source)

Need this for procurement?

We answer security questionnaires against this same list, gaps included. Program updated 2026-10-26.

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